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ARTICLES
REORGANIZATIONS AND STOCHASTIC
COLLATERAL VALUE
ROYCE DE R. BARONDES*

Bebchuk and Fried propose using a series of auctions to implement a
market-based methodology for valuing secured claims in a reorganization.
This Article demonstrates their procedure can result in a secured creditor
receiving more than its ex ante bargain, and that the probability distribution
of possible collateral values can be relevant to fulfilling the ex ante bargain.
This Article further develops and examines a refinement of the
Bebchuk and Fried procedure that provides an approximate solution to the
overcompensation of secured creditors. This refinement reconceptualizes
collateral as comprising two components: (i) a call option on that property,
exercisable at the time the secured claim would become due, with an
exercise price of the amount that would be due on the secured claim at the
corresponding time, and (ii) the property subject to that call option. This
Article details how revising the Bebchuk and Fried proposal in light of this
insight can yield a market-based methodology that produces an
approximation of the ex ante bargain.
INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s, Baird' and Jackson 2 separately examined the use of an

auction procedure as a substitute for bankruptcy reorganizations. 3 Their
analyses were followed by a torrent of scholarship examining various4
market-based substitutes for contemporary reorganization procedures,
"Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; J.D., University of
Virginia, 1985; S.M. & S.B., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982.
' Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127,
128 (1986).
2
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LiMrrs OF BANKRuPTcY LAW 223-24 (1986).
3This work followed Roe's proposal for valuing bankrupt public firms through a reorganization in
which the reorganized debtor's capital structure would consist solely of common stock, where the
issuer's value would be ascertained by an offering often percent of the reorganized firm's equity. See
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 530
(1983).
4
See Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley and
Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REv.79, 79 (1992) ("The beating of the drums grows louder. In academia,
they beat for a market-based solution to the problem of bankruptcy reorganization. The product is a
steady procession of articles, each calling for the market to play a larger role. Most deposit a specific
proposal for reform as their offering on the academic altar."); Elizabeth 'Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257, 1260 (1994) ("So far as
we know, the semi-automatic market solution has had no presence or even close analogy in the financial
world. Yet the article has been a terrific success in the academic world. The piece has spawned a
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which has continued unabated. Some have proposed allowing a debtor to
select the law that will govern any subsequent bankruptcy.5 Alternatively, a
wealth of recent legal scholarship has proposed different details for marketbased substitutes for current reorganization procedures.6 For example,
Bebchuk proposed effecting reorganizations through issuance of certain
options to various holders of claims or interests. Adler and Ayres have
recently proposed a market-based solution they term a "dilution
mechanism," in which a "court would issue ... shares in the reorganized
firm to the senior claimants and would then solicit schedules of firm offers
to buy [from junior claimants] or sell [from senior claimants] at a fixed
price," after which transactions in the shares would be effected at the
clearing quantity.8
All these proposals seek to address a basic valuation problem, in which
the holders of claims or interests in a debtor attribute different valuations to
the debtor's assets. As Adler and Ayres assert, "[V]aluation is the most
hotly contested and debated topic in the realm of corporate bankruptcy
law."59
Bankruptcy law has to address various valuation problems. Property
values may change during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. As an
illustration of this type of valuation problem, in the case of a post-petition
increase in the value of collateral, the law must address whether the secured
generation of speculative articles proposing various formulaic solutions to the bankruptcy problems of
unspecified worlds. And its form of speculation without reference to reality-which had many
precedents-has since been widely imitated." (footnote omitted) (referencing Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A
New Approach to CorporateReorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1988))).
See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtorv Choice: A Menu Approach to CorporateBankruptcy,
71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 53-54 (1992) (arguing firms should have the option to select one of a variety of
legal options to govern upon any insolvency of the firm); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of
Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm,77 TEX. L. REV. 515 (1999) (analyzing favorably the enforceability
of certain pre-bankruptcy waivers of specified bankruptcy provisions); Alan Schwartz, A Contract
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1819 (1998); Alan Schwartz,
Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127, 129 (1997) ('[T]he current ban on
contracting for bankruptcy procedures should be repealed.").
6 Illustrative articles calling for repeal of, or substantial revision to, contemporary reorganization
practice include those referenced infra notes 7-8, as well as Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk
Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 489 (1992) (arguing for the repeal ofbankruptcy's reorganization
provisions); Barry E. Adler, Financialand Political Theories ofAmerican CorporateBankruptcy, 45
STAN. L. REv. 311, 323-33 (1993) (proposing a unique type of security as a contractual arrangement
that could eliminate the need for reorganizations); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the
Shadow of Murphys Lamv: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure,88 MICH. L.
REv. 2097, 2141 (1990) ("[W]e lack any persuasive theory for why we have or ought to have
bankruptcy legislation."); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1049 (1992) (providing evidence putatively supporting the conclusion that
adoption of the Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549,
produced a bankruptcy regime that increased the cost of reorganization to shareholders and
bondholders, relative to prior law); and Robert G. Hansen & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in
Bankruptcy: Theoretical Analysis and PracticalGuidance, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 159, 161-62
(1998) (proposing mandatory liquidating auctions if either a debtor in possession does not file a
proposed plan of reorganization within 120 days or the plan is not accepted within sixty days (both
being firm deadlines)).
7Bebchuk, supra note 4. See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Chapter 11, in I THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 219,222-23 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
aBarry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanismfor Valuing Corporationsin Bankruptcy, 111
YALE9L.J. 83, 101 (2001).
Id.at85.
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creditor or other holders of claims or interests should benefit from the
increase.10 As a second example, changes in collateral value can im licate
a secured creditor's right to adequate protection under section 363(e). I
The preceding valuation issues arise from values that change over time.
Courts also have to address valuation of rights having a stochastic (random)
component.
Future tort claims, e.g., those of asbestos claimants, are one
12
example.
The presence of secured claims may create additional valuation issues
in implementing a market-based substitute to reorganizations. Valuation of
the collateral is required to value a corresponding secured claim. The value
to be received by the creditor is limited by the amount of its claim, even if
the collateral is worth more than the claim. 13 Where collateral is worth less
than the claim it secures, the claim, to the extent of the excess, is
unsecured.1 4 Thus, implementation of a market-based substitute to current
reorganization procedures must value collateral.
Bebchuk and Fried assert, "[L]t has thus far been thought that even
under such market-based reforms, collateral value would inevitably
continue to be determined the wag it is now-through time consuming and
costly litigation and bargaining." They further note, "[B]elieving that no
market-based approach to valuing collateral was possible, a prominent
proponent of the auctions approach had viewed the problem of collateral
valuation as one of the
16 main obstacles to implementing market-based
reforms in bankruptcy."
Bebchuk and Fried, in a recent article, 17 propose using a series of
auctions to implement a market-based methodology for valuation of
secured claims in a reorganization. They repeatedly assert, in various
unqualified formulations, their procedure implements the parties'
entitlements, 8 i.e., it respects the ex ante bargain.

1o
See David Gray Carlson, Bjircation of Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 1 22 (1996) (discussing the implications ofDewsnup v. 7mm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992)).
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000). The appropriate reference date for determination of adequate
protection is unsettled. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcy 506.03[10], at 506-99 to 506-100 (Lawrence
P. King ed., rev. 15th ed. 2001).
See generally David S. Salsburg & Jack F. Williams, A Statistical Approach to Claims
Estimation in Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1119 (1997) (providing a statistical methodology
for estimating claims). Problems of claim estimation can arise in the context of claim allowance, voting
on reorganization plans, analyzing plan feasibility, and fixing distributions under plans. See id. at 1129.
'" See generally U.C.C. § 9-608(a) (2001) (corresponds to U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (2000)); 55 A,. JUR.
2D Mortgages § 785 (1996). Section 506(b) allows the secured creditor in this case to recover "interest
on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under which
such claim arose." 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
14See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000).
'5 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in
Bankyptcy, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2386,2406 (2001).
16Id.at 2407.
7
' 1d. at 2386-90.
18 See id. at 2419 ("An important advantage of our proposed mechanism is that none of the
participants in the bankruptcy proceeding would have any basis for complaining about the value of the
secured claim that is generated by the auction of the nonrecourse note. In particular, no secured or
unsecured creditor would be able to complain that this determination results in the participant's getting
less than that participant's entitlement."); id.at 2428, 2436 (to a similar effect); id. at 2392 ("We also
demonstrate how the procedure could be designed to ensure that secured creditors are neither over- nor
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It is, no doubt, desirable to produce an accurate estimate in bankruptcy
proceedings of the current value of collateral. To implement the ex ante
bargain among various creditors, in some circumstances, however,
reorganization procedures must wrestle with more complex valuation
problems. In particular, where a secured claim is not due and payable,
whether at maturity or through a default (but for the bankruptcy proceeding
itself), and the underlying collateral has a stochastic value-it has a random
component-implementing the ex ante bargain among various creditors can
depend on the probability distribution of the collateral value. That is,
implementing the ex ante bargain requires information in addition to the
expected value of the collateral-information over and above that provided
by Bebchuk and Fried's proposed procedure.
The source of this concern can be illustrated with a rather trivial
example. Assume a creditor extends a nonrecourse, 19 non-interest-bearing
loan, payment on which is due in, and not subject to acceleration before,
one year, ina principal amount of $50. The collateral is a lottery ticket,
having a fifty percent chance of paying $100 in one year and a fifty percent
chance of paying nothing.
For ease of exposition, the time value of money and risk aversion will
be disregarded. In this case, the value of the collateral today equals the
face amount of the loan. One might categorize the loan as fully secured.
However, as long as the creditor cannot force its rights to be liquidated by
the debtor before maturity (either in or outside bankruptcy), the loan is
worth only $25-half its face amount. If the lottery ticket pays off,which
it has a fifty percent likelihood of doing, the creditor will receive $50.
Otherwise, the creditor receives nothing.
This Article is not the first to recognize that a creditor's interest
represents a truncated claim in the debtor's assets.
Numerous
commentators use similar examples, albeit in different contexts. 20 This
Article uses similar principles to address the valuation of claims, and, in
particular, secured claims that would not be in default but for a bankruptcy
proceeding (and, perhaps, other secured claims, any default under which
can be cured during a reorganization). Four contributions are made in this
undercompensated."); id. at 2388-89 ("The proposed mechanism determines secured claims in a way
that gives no participant a basis for complaining that secured creditors are either over- or
undercompensated.").
19A nonrecourse obligation is a secured claim in which, by contract, the creditor cannot require
assets other than the collateral be used to satisfy the claim. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1080 (7th
ed. 1999).
20 See, e.g., Baird, supra note 1, at 131-32 (noting an incentive of junior claimants to postpone
resolution of bankruptcy proceedings to prevent freezing of asset valuations); Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, BargainingAfter the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute PriorityRule, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV.738, 750-52 (1988); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy:
An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 159 n.6 (1989)
(providing a similar example). See generally G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein, & Eric M. Zolt,
ConnectedContracts,47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 901-02 (2000) (discussing how alteration of variance can
affect rights among claimants having different priorities); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganizationof Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U.
PA. L. REv. 669, 772-74 (1993) (stating there commonly will be multiple "residual" owners of a firm
being reorganized).
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Article. First, this Article demonstrates proper valuation of collateral is not
always sufficient to determine whether a reorganization preserves the ex
ante bargain among creditors, i.e., the probability distribution of possible
values can be relevant to fulfilling the ex ante bargain.
This principle can be restated using the terminology of Baird and
Jackson. They seek to ascertain the residual owner of an insolvent firm, for
purposes of "making sure that the residual owner has control over the
negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructuring, ' 21 by
assuming "all future possibilities [are] collapsed to present values. 22 If a
debtor is liquidated, all claims will be valued in a process that collapses
future states to current values. Equivalent treatment may, but need not, be
accorded to a class of claims in a reorganization.
For example, the cram-down provisions may require that a secured
creditor receive, in respect of the fully-secured portion of its claim,
payments "of a value.., of at least the value of such holder's interest in the
estate's interest in such property. '' 23 This value may correlate to collapsing
probability distributions. Collapsing future states to current values
frequently will benefit a senior creditor (eliminating variance in outcomes
that give rise to potential value to otherwise underwater claims). 24 In a
reorganization, however, a creditor cannot always be assured that its
treatment will be as good as it would be were future states collapsed to
current values. A creditor, in a reorganization, cannot necessarily force an
outcome that implements a collapsing of future possibilities to current
values.

21Baird & Jackson,
22Id. at 761.

supra note 20, at 775.

2 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(n1) (2000).
24 See Baird, supra note 1, at 131-32; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 20, at 773-74 (stating a
possibility that a debtor's position will improve may make currently underwater claims valuable).
2 Cf LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 20, at 773 ("[Baird and Jackson] reach this result by
'collapsing' the future possibilities of different values to a single present value and using this latter
value to identify the single residual owner.... Yet for them to say that the future possibilities of
different values have been collapsed to a single value by the debtor's default under the loan agreement
does not make it so.").
At some points, Bebchuk and Fried seem to describe a bankruptcy code that does not include the
reinstatement provisions described below. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text. In other
language, however, they modify with the phrase, "we assume," descriptions of a reorganization process
that overlooks the implications of the reinstatement provisions, suggesting an awareness of the
imprecision of the modified statements.
Their descriptions of bankruptcy law that appear inconsistent with the reinstatement provisions
include the following:
(i) "Under existing Chapter 11 rules, however, the debtor may keep the collateral only if the
debtor pays the creditor in full for its secured claim with either cash or a note, secured by the collateral,
whose payments have a present value equal to the amount of the secured claim." Bebchuk & Fried,
supranote 15, at 2426. Yet a footnote in their piece to the sentence second immediately preceding this
quoted sentence references the reinstatement provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1124. See id at 2426 n.1 15.
(ii) "[I]t is a basic tenet of bankruptcy law that the secured creditor has the right to receive the
value of its collateral (up to the amount owed)." Id. at 2395. See also id. at 2397 (reiterating the
assertion in similar terms). That statement is ambiguous. The natural reading is "jI]t is a basic tenet of
bankruptcy law that the secured creditor in a bankruptcyproceedinghas the right to receive the value of
its collateral as of that time (up to the amount owed)." That statement is not correct.
Their descriptions of this aspect of the law couched as assumptions include:
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Second, this Article develops and examines a refinement of the
Bebchuk and Fried procedure that provides an approximate solution to the
overcompensation of secured creditors having security interests in
stochastic collateral. Under the Bebchuk and Fried proposal, the secured
portion of a claim is valued by auctioning a nonrecourse note, having a face
amount equal to the amount of the claim, with recourse to that collateral.
This refinement reconceptualizes that collateral as comprising two
components: (i) a call option on that property, exercisable at the time the
secured claim would become due and exercisable at the amount that would
be due on the secured claim at that time, and (ii) the property subject to that
call option. For purposes of implementing the goals of Bebchuk and
Fried's proposal, of these two components, the collateral of the nonrecourse
note should be subject to, i.e., junior to, that call option.
Third, this Article examines the practical limitations on implementing
that refinement and identifies the reason for the difference between results
from that approximation and the outcome that would result were the ex
ante bargain fully respected.
Fourth, this Article examines the extent to which the reinstatement
provisions of section 1124(2) of the Bankruptcy Code26 allow for the
preservation of the ex ante bargain with secured creditors having a security
interest in stochastic collateral. In particular, it demonstrates that such a
secured creditor cannot be assured of receiving the excessive compensation
contemplated by the Bebchuk and Fried proposal.
For ease of presentation, these four contributions are developed and
presented below in a different order. The remainder of this Article
proceeds as follows: Part I examines the "right" answer-how bankruptcy
law should value the claims of a secured creditor having stochastic
collateral, in order to implement the bargain previously struck among the
creditors. Part II then examines the extent to which current bankruptcy law
allows for resolutions that implement this outcome. Part III then discusses
Bebchuk and Fried's proposal. It develops the reconceptualization of
stochastic collateral as comprising two components, a call option and the
collateral subject to that call option. It details the proposed refinement to
Bebchuk and Fried's proposal and examines the difference between that
(i) "By 'entitlement' we mean the amount the secured creditor is entitled to get for its secured
claim at the end of the proceeding-which we assume is the foreclosure value-up to the amount
owed." Id. at 2404 n.69 (emphasis added).
(ii) "We assume that bankruptcy law intends to give a secured creditor that same entitlement. That
is, the secured creditor in bankruptcy has a right to the 'foreclosure value' of the collateral, up to the
amount owed, as well as an unsecured claim for any deficiency." Id. at 2397 (emphasis added).
A footnote in their piece addresses application of the procedure to a claim that is not "due." See
id. at 2411 n.95. Whether a claim is "due" is a factor in assessing whether it can be reinstated. That
footnote, supplemented by reference to a prepublication version of the paper to correct a typographical
error, provides, "We assume the loan is due immediately. [If the] loan were not due immediately, its
value would be discounted to reflect the time value of money." 1d. (bracketed language provided in
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy 27
n.97 (Apr. 2001) (prepublication
manuscript, on file with author), available at
http:llwww.law.harvard.edulfaculty/bebchuklpdfsl0l.fried-bebchuk.olin321.pdf.
26 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (2000).
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refinement and complete allegiance to the ex ante bargain. Following Part
III, a few concluding remarks are provided.
I.

THE PROPER TREATMENT OF STOCHASTIC COLLATERAL IN
BANKRUPTCY

The reasons for secured credit itself are something of a puzzle. 27 There
are various candidates, some of the more intuitive of which are the
following. First, it may be that the granting of a security interest allows a
creditor to deter opportunistic debtor misconduct, by the creation of a
"hostage"-an asset the victim (a creditor) can seize in the case of debtor

malfeasance.2 8 Second, it may reflect a variation among creditors in ability

to value different types of collateral. At the time credit is extended, a
creditor will not pay for (in the form of a lower rate of interest) senior
rights in an asset if the creditor cannot value the asset at the time it extends
credit. In such a case, segregating priorities among different assets may
allow debtors to benefit.
Third, certain creditors may be better at
realizing on certain types of collateral in the case of a default.3" In that

case, giving prior rights in that collateral to a particular creditor can allow a
debtor to obtain more favorable terms on its credit. Fourth, providing

differential rights may enhance creditor monitoring, thereby creating better
lending terms, either because some creditors can more efficiently monitor a
debtor's use of collateral, 3' or by eliminating freeriding among creditors in
their monitoring.32 Fifth, secured credit may limit the ability of a borrower
to engage in further borrowing. It has been argued the debtor may "pay
more attention to its business if the borrower has a more substantial stake in
the business, 33s and limits on future borrowing capacity arising from

secured credit may result in an increased equity stake.
That is not to say all rationales for allowing the creation of securit34
interests imply the practice is efficient and meritorious of protection.
27 See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARv. L. REv. 625, 628
(1997) (stating prior commentators have been unsuccessful in explaining the efficiency of the use of
security interests); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the
Irresistible Force: Rethinking the Relationship Between Secured Credit and Bankruptcy Policy, 95
MICH. L. REv. 2234, 2255-56 (1997). See generally Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect
Information: The Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1373, 1376 (1997) ("The
justification for contractual priority remains, at best disputed, and at worst, thoroughly debunked.").
28 See Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing,82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 1449-50
(1997 jCf Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and CorporateRisk Allocation, 72 TuL. L. REV.

101, 102 (1997) ("By providing a means through which creditors may obtain a priority in particular
assets, secured lending allows lenders to tie more closely their risk assessments to the value of
particular assets.").
30 See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STuD. 209, 243 n.48 (1989)
(discussing repossession skills).
31 See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and PrioritiesAmong
Creditors,88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1158 (1979).
32 See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and CorporateSettings, 92
YALE
L.J. 49,55 (1982).
3Mann, supranote 27, at 641-42.
34But cf Frank H. Easterbrook, Is CorporateBankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411,413-14
(1990) (concluding efficiency is the "likely explanation" for the persistence of reorganization law that
does not require an auction of the firm). See generally Frost, supra note 29, at 127 ("[T]he institution
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LoPucki argues one explanation for secured credit is it disadvantages
involuntary and uninformed unsecured creditors, to the advantage of
secured parties.3 5 Alternatively, secured credit may allow for the provision
of credit where it otherwise would not be obtainable; 36 a plausibly desirable
outcome, but one that does not necessarily increase aggregate value.
The analysis in this Article, however, proceeds accepting the ability of
participants to create security interests. If the law allows for their creation,
it is appropriate to respect the bargains struck among creditors and debtors
in their creation of security interests by not allocating in a bankruptcy
proceeding greater value to a secured creditor on account of its interest in
collateral than was bargained for by the secured creditor.37 Where
collateral value has a stochastic component and the secured claim is not
due (but for acceleration by virtue of a bankruptcy proceeding),3 8 valuation
implementing the rights for which the secured creditor bargained can
depend on the probability distribution of the various possible outcomes.39
Knowledge of the expected value of the collateral alone may be insufficient
to value the secured claim. The reason is secured creditors have truncated
interests in collateral-interests that are truncated by the amounts of their
respective secured claims. Where collateral in some possible future states
will have a value, of a present value that exceeds the amount of a secured
of secured finance... is 'probably efficient."' (quoting James J. White, Work and Play in Revising
Article
359, 80 VA. L. REv. 2089,2089 (1994))).
See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1891 (1994).
36
See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 27, at 2257.
37One might view bankruptcy law governing reorganizations as necessarily involving conveying
to senior claimants less than the rights for which they bargained (before giving effect to bankruptcy
law). The concept is that, in some cases, the debtor will be worth more reorganized and, therefore, to
allow realization of that aggregate value, rights of a senior claimant need to be reworked. Cf id.at
2273-74 ("[T]he bargain metaphor is untenable in a bankruptcy case.... The idea of 'fresh start,'
whatever else it means, demands that we cleave a wide chasm between the debtor's pre and postfiling
lives. To do so implies that there is no more intrinsic reason for clinging to the bargain metaphor in the
case of security interests than there is in the case of garden-variety unsecured contractual obligations."
(footnote omitted)). But that principle does not require a secured creditor receive more than it
bargained for.
Others have, in fact, proposed the law should only partially respect security interests, i.e., the law
should allocate secured creditors only a fraction of their explicitly negotiated priority. See, e.g., Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Casefor the Priorityof Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
105 YALE L.J. 857, 866 (1996); Kenneth N. Klee, Barbariansat the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the
Warren Carve-Out Proposal,82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1468 (1997) ("Professor Elizabeth Warren has
suggested that Article 9 be amended to dedicate a portion of the secured party's collateral to repayment
of judicial lien creditors.").
38Unmatured claims can give rise to a claim cognizable in bankruptcy. Paragraph (5) of § 101 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000), explicitly includes in the definition of "claim" an
unmatured right to payment and an unmatured equitable remedy for breach of performance. Under this
provision, a holder of a claim includes a creditor who has fully performed its obligations under a
contract, even where the debtor's obligations have not yet matured. As to an executory contract, a
rejection of the contract effects a breach. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2000). Thus, a bankruptcy
proceeding can effectively accelerate an unmatured claim. See, e.g., Ponoroff & Knippenberg,
supranote 27, at 2290 ("[A] bankruptcy case involves nothing less than the complete acceleration and
adjudication of all claims against the debtor-liquidated and unliquidated, contingent and
noncontingent, disputed and undisputed, matured and unmatured, secured and unsecured-in a single,
expedited proceeding." (footnote omitted)).
39 In a parallel development, recent scholarship addresses the additional complexity in proper
selection of damages in restitution or quasi contract where the value of the benefit conferred has a
stochastic component. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Robert A. Mikos, Recovery for ProbabilisticBenefit
(May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/-omri/Recovery.pdf.
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creditor's claim, valuation of a secured claim may depend on the
probability distribution-not merely the expected value-of future
collateral value. "Valuation" here is used to refer to actual value, not a
value ascribed in a bankruptcy proceeding.
An example, to which reference will be made throughout this Article,
described textually and summarized in Figure 1, illustrates the point.
Consider a debtor having assets of a value of $80 and liabilities of $100.
For ease of exposition, and without affecting the principle, interest, risk
aversion, and the time value of money are disregarded. The assets consist
of a business venture having a value of $20, with the other assets having a
value of $60. There is a random component to the value of the business
venture. There is a seventy-five percent chance that it will be successful.
If it is successful, its value is $25. There is a twenty-five percent chance,
however, that it will be unsuccessful and will be worth only $5. At some
point in time in the future, e.g., one year, it will be revealed whether the
venture will be successful.
Aggregate claims against the debtor are $100. They consist of a claim
held by secured creditor S, in the amount of $20, secured by the business
venture, and an unsecured claim held by U, in the amount of $80. It is
further assumed the claim held by S would not be due and payable, but for
the bankruptcy, until shortly after the time the success or failure of the
business venture will be revealed.
The debtor's financial position is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: DebtorsFinancialPositionBefore a Reorganization
Assets:
Venture

Other

$20.00

75%---$25.00
25%--$5.00
Subject to security
securing S's claim

interest

$60.00

Liabilities:
S

$20.00

Security interest in venture

U

$80.00

Unsecured

Equity:
($20.00)
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Put aside for the moment ascertaining the value bankruptcy law
ascribes to secured creditor S's position, which is the subject of Part II.
One may examine the value S's ex ante bargain ascribes to this
circumstance. Reference to the expected value of the collateral indicates S
is fully secured and has a claim worth $20.
However, ifS has not bargained for its claim to be due and payable, but
for the bankruptcy, 40 until the success of the venture has been revealed, S's
claim will be worth less. This circumstance generally exists where, in
some outcomes, S would be oversecured and a portion of the value of the
collateral would inure to the benefit of other claimants, and, in other
outcomes, S would be undersecured.
If S cannot compel the liquidation of its claim by the debtor until after
the success of the venture is revealed, then S, as of this time, has an interest
that has a seventy-five percent likelihood of being worth $20 and a twentyfive percent likelihood of being worth $14.47 (a secured claim of $5 and an
unsecured claim of $15, among total unsecured claims of $95, on assets of
$60). The computation of this value, $18.62, is depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Valuation of Debt Before Reorganization

0 ($15.00 + $80.00

S:
or $18.62
U:

$80.00 - $18.62, or $61.38

Because the equity is worthless, the value of the unsecured claim can
be computed by subtracting the value of the secured claim from the total
value, $80.
In sum, the timing of the valuation affects the value of S's secured
claim. The computation is somewhat similar to that of the familiar
overinvestment problem for distressed firms, in which equity holders have
an interest in having the firm pursue very risky strategies because they
share a portion of gains greater than the share of losses they will bear.4'
40 In practice, a security agreement may allow for acceleration of a secured obligation if the
creditor "deem[s] itself insecure." See, e.g., Brown v. AVEMCO Inv. Corp., 603 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th
Cir. 1979). Skeel argues a lender likely could not use such a provision immediately after a
reorganization to accelerate a loan reinstated in the reorganization. See David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The
Nature and Effect of CorporateVoting in Chapter11 ReorganizationCases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 482
n.78 (1992) (referencing U.C.C. § 1-208).
41 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Finn: Managerial
Behavior; Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334 (1976). See also WILLIAM
A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 256-58 (6th ed. 1996);
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PERMISSIBLE TREATMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN
STOCHASTIC COLLATERAL UNDER CHAPTER 11

Part I demonstrated that, if the parties have bargained for secured credit
to become due after revelation of the true value of collateral initially having
a stochastic value, premature valuation of the secured credit can deviate
from the bargained-for allocation of interests. Part I, however, has not
examined the contours of applicable federal bankruptcy law.
Assume the creditors in the above example (identified in Figure 1) are
sophisticated. They are aware of the contours of applicable law.
Applicable bankruptcy law would constitute a term they understand to be
incorporated into their explicit bargain.
That fact introduces a potentially confounding factor. Assume federal
law, as it applies to a reorganization of the debtor depicted in Figure 1,
allows the secured creditor S to realize a value of $20. In such a case, one
could never know whether the parties ex ante desired for the secured
creditor to realize a value of $20 in a bankruptcy proceeding where S's
claim was not otherwise due or whether the parties ex ante would have
preferred an alternative resolution in that proceeding. This Part addresses
whether federal bankruptcy law in fact always requires that the secured
creditor S receive a value of $20 in that circumstance (and concludes that it
does not).
A.

REINSTATEMENT GENERALLY

Let us assume the debtor is worth more as a going concern than it
would be were it liquidated. Thus, the debtor is being reorganized under
Chapter 11.42 In general, section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code provides
that a class of claims is not impaired where a plan of reorganization cures
existing defaults and reinstates the claims. 43

Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Lmv and Its ProperDomain, 38
VAND. L. REV. 829, 833-34 (1985).
42 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (2000) (excluding subchapter IV-Railroad Reorganization, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1161-1174
(2000)).
43
Id. § 1124(2). Section 1124 provides a class is unimpaired where the plan:
notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that entitles the holder of
such claim or interest to demand or receive accelerated payment of such claim or interest
after the occurrence of a default(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the commencement of the case
under this title, other than a default of a kind specified in section 365(b)(2) of this title;
(B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as such maturity existed before
such default;
(C) compensates the holder of such claim or interest for any damages incurred as a
result of any reasonable reliance by such holder on such contractual provision or such
applicable law; and
(D) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which such
claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest.
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Section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code44 sets forth requirements for
confirmation of a plan of reorganization. Paragraph (a)(8) 45 sets forth
voting requirements. There is no need to seek the explicit acceptance of a
class of unimpaired claims because such a class is conclusively presumed
to have accepted the plan. 46 Thus, the actual dissatisfaction of a class of
unimpaired claims with a plan
of reorganization does not require resort to
7
the cram-down provisions.
In the example illustrated in Figure 1, if the secured creditor S were not
impaired in a reorganization, all defaults were cured and S's claim were
reinstated, a plan of reorganization could be approved notwithstanding S's
dissatisfaction with the plan.
A plan of reorganization meeting those requirements is depicted in
Figure 3. For ease of illustration, interest is disregarded. In sum, the plan
provides for the reduction of the claims of unsecured creditor U to a face
amount of $50.52, now secured by a first lien on all assets of the firm other
than the business venture, and conveyance of all the equity in the firm to U.
S's legal, equitable, and contractual rights are not altered.

44
4 Id. § 1129.
1Id. § 1129(a)(8).
46
Seeid § 1126(f).
4

1See id. § 1129(b).
A cram-down must be "fair and equitable" to each class that is impaired and has not accepted the
plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). As to a secured creditor, this provision requires "the plan not unfairly
shift risk of loss to the secured creditor. In order to maintain the secured creditor's relative balance of
risk, the secured creditor cannot, among other things, be put in a worse off position from a collateral
perspective." 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, 506.0317][d][iii], at 506-83 to 506-84. For
this purpose, a court examines whether the secured creditor's equity cushion would be maintained
following the reorganization.
A commentator asserts that, under this standard, a creditor has not been accorded "fair and
equitable" treatment to the extent anticipated foreclosure value at some time following a reorganization
will decline more than the scheduled principal amortization under the plan as of that time. See id.
$1506.03[7][d][iii], at 506-84 to 506-86. Implementing this understanding of the "fair and equitable"
requirement would involve comparing the rights of the secured creditor, after the reorganization, and the
secured creditor's position at the time of the reorganization, after (following Baird and Jackson's
terminology, see Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 761) collapsing the probability distribution of the
collateral value. Referencing the example depicted in Figure 1, were the "fair and equitable"
requirement applicable, this understanding of the "fair and equitable" requirement would require the
secured creditor be fully secured in future states. See supra fig.1. That is, the plan depicted in Figure 3
would not be "fair and equitable." See infra fig.3.
Regardless of the merits of that interpretation of "fair and equitable," however, the "fair and
equitable" requirement is inapplicable to secured claims unimpaired in a reorganization. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(1). But cf Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 15, at 2398 ("If a secured creditor challenges the
distribution plan and the judge finds that it is not fair and equitable, the judge will not permit the firm to
emerge from bankruptcy. Thus, whether a Chapter 11 plan is considered fair and equitable-and
therefore whether the proceeding can conclude-will depend in part on the value of the secured
creditor's collateral." (footnote omitted)). Thus, preserving the ex ante bargain made in the shadow of
the "fair and equitable" requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1), does not require the secured creditor S,
in the circumstance depicted in Figure 1, receive a value greater than that depicted in Figure 4 (and, as
discussed infra p. 210, it can receive less).
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Figure3: Debtors FinancialPositionAfter Reorganization
Assets:
Venture

$20.00

75/o--$25.00
25%-$5.GI0
Subject to security
securing S's claim

Other

interest

$60.00

Liabilities:
S

$20.00

Security interest in venture

U

$50.52

Security interest in all assets
other than venture

$9.48

All equity

Eciuitv:
U

S is unimpaired because all defaults have been cured and S's legal,
equitable, and contractual rights are not altered. Moreover, as depicted in
Figure 4, the values of both S's and U's rights have remained unchanged.
As noted below, that is not, in fact, required.48
Figure 4: Valuation of Debt andEquity After a Reorganization

S:

.75 x $20.00 + .25 [$5.00 + ($60.00 - $50.52)], or
$18.62

U:

$80.00 - $18.62, or (computed a second way)
.75 ($85.00 - $20.00) + .25 ($50.52), or
$61.38

In practice, reinstatement is not the sole method by which the secured
creditor may receive less than $20. Manipulation of valuations may result
in an outcome in which the secured creditor does not realize property worth
the present value of the collateral. 49 Reference to the reinstatement
41 See infra Part II.D.
49 See, e.g., Jackson & Scott, supranote 20, at 189 (stating, in discussing the selection of a

discount rate, "Frequently, it is clear that the courts endorse redistribution from secured creditors to
unsecured creditors and equity interests.").
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provisions is valuable, however, because it demonstrates the secured
creditor may receive less than the present value of its collateral even
without valuation legerdemain.
B.

CLASSIFICATION OF CLAIMS

Implicit in this outcome is that the secured creditor (here, S) is
classified separately from any other claimant (here, U). The secured
creditor might complain about the propriety of this classification. In
particular, it might argue that if it does not receive the value of the
collateral, it has an unsecured claim that should be classified with the
unsecured claim of U. That classification would require equal treatment of
U's unsecured claim and any unsecured portion of S's claim 50 and,
therefore, impairment of S.
Separate classification of similar claims has generated some
controversy. The normal case in which this issue is presented involves
attempts to classify separately a group of claimants in order to obtain the
consent of one impaired class-a requirement for plan confirmation. 5'
Courts have been reluctant to allow manipulation of the classification of
claims to create an impaired class that approves the plan,52 although some
authority allows separate classification where a subset of the claimants with
similar interests
53 is of particular importance to the success of the
reorganization.
Section 112254 does not, however, expressly require similar claims to
be aggregated in a single class, and the normal cases concerning
gerrymandering are inapposite to an examination of whether secured
creditor S could be classified separately. Section 1124(2) 55 explicitly
contemplates a plan of reorganization in which a debtor cures defaults
under a reinstated contract and the creditor's rights are left unaltered. That
power frequently would be illusory as to unsecured claims, were similar
claims required to be in a single class. That suggests whatever the general
merits of cases addressing any requirement to classify together similar
claims, that authority should not implicitly require such classification

SOSee 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(4) (2000).
51See id. § 1129(a)(10).

52See, e.g., Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint
Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1991) (setting aside a classification of an unsecured claim,
consisting of a deficiency claim under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b), separate from other holders of unsecured
claims, stating, "(O]rdinarily 'substantially similar claims,' those which share common priority and
rights against the debtor's estate, should be placed in the same class."); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 11,
1122.03[6][a, at 1122-22 ("Generally, courts have rejected classifications based on
apparent attempts to 'gerrymander' claims so as to create an impaired class that will vote in favor of a
plan of reorganization. In this context, a majority of circuits have held that unsecured deficiency claims
created under section 1111(b) cannot for this sole reason be classified separately from other unsecured
claims.").
53See, e.g., 5 DANIEL R. CowvANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 20.19, at 210-11 (7th ed.
1998),(finding authority in four circuits).
11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2000).
55Id. § 1124(2).
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across claims, some of which are to be reinstated under section 1124(2).56
A possible implicit requirement should not be read to eviscerate an express
statutory provision.
C.

FEASIBILITY

The provisions of paragraph (a)(1 1) of section 1129, 57 referenced as the
feasibility requirement,5 8 also are implicated by the plan of reorganization
depicted in Figure 3. That section requires that "[c]onfirmation of the plan
is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further
financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under
the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the
plan." 59
In advance of the reorganization of this hypothetical debtor, there was a
non-zero probability that the secured creditor S would not be paid in full.
That circumstance is a prerequisite for the probability distribution of the
value of the collateral to be relevant. There is a possibility that the
reorganized debtor depicted in Figure 3 will not meet its obligations in the
future.
One might make the following argument: the feasibility requirement
prevents confirmation of plans of reorganization in which there is a
possibility the debtor will become insolvent after it is reorganized. The
plan of reorganization depicted in Figure 3 includes such a possibility. In
fact, the existence of such a possibility is required in order for a
reorganization not to alter the secured creditor's rights and, at the same
time, provide for an expected value less than the amount of its claim. Such
a plan is not feasible. Thus, the argument would conclude, reorganization
plans not involving either a cram-down or the consent of a secured creditor
must in practice provide the secured creditor with the value of the
collateral.
That argument is incorrect. "As numerous courts have explained, 'the
court need not require a guarantee of success,' which of course would be
difficult to predict for any venture much less one emerging from chapter
60
11. 'Only a reasonable assurance of commercial viability is required."'
A commentator notes, "Although creditors sometimes press the issue, the
possibility of failure is not fatal. As one court noted, 'it is clear that there is
56 See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supranote 11,
1122.03[1][a], at 1122-6 ("Since Congress
obviously intended that the proponent of a plan have the flexibility to separately classify certain general
unsecured claims, and thereby leave such claims unimpaired if such treatment was advantageous to the
debtor, the argument that all claims of the same legal nature must be included within one class is not
persuasive. For example, a debtor might wish to cure and reinstate a particularly low interest loan while
payin other creditors or giving them notes at a more current interest rate." (footnote omitted)).
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2000).
58See, e.g., Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 551, 569 n.97 (1995).
" 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2000).
6o Heartland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe Enters., Ltd., If),
994 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Lakeside Global II, 116 B.R.
499,507 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989)).
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a relatively low threshold of proof necessary to satisfy the feasibility
requirement."'.6 '
Plans of reorganization, such as that depicted in Figure 3, involving a
modest possibility of subsequent failure thus should not be prevented by
the feasibility requirement. In other cases, feasibility might require an
intermediate solution for an unimpaired secured creditor having a security
interest in stochastic collateral-a reorganization in which, as of plan
confirmation, the expected value of the secured creditor's rights is between
the value of the collateral as of that time and the pre-bankruptcy value of
the secured claim based on a truncated interest in the collateral.
Nevertheless, the provisions of bankruptcy law read into the ex ante
bargain do not place a floor on the value of a secured creditor's rights after
reorganization equal to the expected value of the collateral at the time of
the reorganization.
D.

NEGATIVE PLEDGE

The plan of reorganization depicted in Figure 3 provides for the
granting of a security interest to a previously unsecured creditor. In some
62
cases, a creditor, such as S,will have bargained for a negative pledge.
This particular plan of reorganization requires that S does not benefit from
such a covenant; otherwise, there would be a default upon consummation
of the plan.
The principle discussed above-that the holder of a secured claim
cannot be assured that, after a reorganization, it will have property with an
actual value at least equal to the value of the collateral as of that time-is
not limited to cases where the creditor does not benefit from a negative
pledge. First, even if the debtor has granted the creditor a negative pledge,
the debtor may not receive value equal to the current value of the collateral.
Second, depending on the precise terms of the secured creditor's
contractual rights, other methods might be used to effect the same result.
The rationale for each of these conclusions is now developed.
If S had the benefit of a negative pledge, other plans of reorganization
could be implemented that reinstated S and provided S with a present value
61 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11,
1129.03[l1], at 1129-65 (citations omitted)
(quoting Berkeley Fed. Bank & Trust v. Sea Garden Motel & Apartments (In re Sea Garden Motel &
Apartments), 195 B.R. 294, 305 (D.N.J. 1996)). That the possibility of post-reorganization financial
distress will not prevent a reorganization is also implicit in certain present value calculations used in
bankruptcy proceedings. In a cram-down over the objection of an impaired class of secured claims, the
corresponding secured creditors must be provided with deferred payments with a present value equal to
the amounts of their interests in the estate's interest in the collateral.
See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2000). The discount rate used to make that computation may be higher than the
risk-free rate, where required to compensate the secured creditor for default risk. See Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Bryson Props., XVIII (In re Bryson Props., XVIII), 961 F.2d 496, 500 n.4 (4th Cir. 1992); 7 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, $ 1129.06[1][c][ii], at 1129-148 to 1129-149.
62 A negative pledge is an agreement under which a debtor agrees not to grant a third party a
security interest in the debtor's property. See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out:
Negative Pledge Covenants, Propertyand Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 306 (1999). Negative
pledge covenants are relatively common. See Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in
Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1396, 1409 (1997) (commercial loans and privately placed and public
debt); Schwartz, supranote 30, at 218 (public debt).
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of less than $20. That is, it is not the case that a secured creditor benefiting
from a negative pledge can be assured of possessing after a reorganization
property of a value at least equal to the lesser of the amount of its claim or
the present value of the collateral. For example, revising the plan of
reorganization depicted in Figure 3 to provide that U received unsecured
debt of $55 and all the equity would result in S having claims worth $19.46
after the reorganization (continuing to disregard issues of the time value of
money, interest, and risk aversion). 63 The example illustrated in Figure 3,
in which U receives a security interest, is used because it emphasizes the
extent to which the reorganization appears feasible. There is a tradeoff
between feasibility and granting U a security interest in the reorganized
debtor's assets. A greater security interest allows plans that are more likely
to meet a feasibility standard.
A variety of mechanisms may be used in various contexts to implement
the equivalent of a security interest that would not violate a negative
pledge. For example, a plan of reorganization might result in conveying all
the debtor's assets to a new subsidiary that would incur debt in the
reorganization, with the debtor's assets after the reorganization consisting
solely of all the equity of this newly formed subsidiary. The effect on the
reinstated creditor, an outcome that is implemented in various contexts, is
In such a case,
sometimes called "structural subordination." 64
reinstatement of a secured creditor's claim would result in the reinstated
claim being subordinated in practice-by the corporate structure-to all the
debts of the subsidiary.65 Repayment of the reinstated claim would be
junior to all debts of the subsidiary, as payment of the reinstated claim
could come from dividends paid by the subsidiary, payment of which is
junior to all debts of the subsidiary. As in the case of the negative pledge,
whether this scheme would work, or whether another approach would be
used, would depend on the precise terms of the reinstated contract.
The purpose of this discussion is not to provide a comprehensive list of
the methods by which a negative pledge can be avoided. Effecting those
desires is a traditional obligation of a corporate lawyer,66 and the precise
63This

amount is computed as follows: .75 x$20.00+.25 [S5.00 + ( 15.00+S55.00

)S60.00].

64 See, e.g., F. John Stark, II, J. Andrew Rahl, Jr., & Lori C. Seegers, "MarriottRisk": A New
Model Covenant to Restrict Transfers of Wealth from Bondholders to Stockholders, 1994 CoLuM. Bus.
L. REV. 503, 517 n.52 (1994).
65 Under the doctrine of substantive consolidation, a court has the power to disregard such a
corporate structure. "The power to consolidate is one arising out of equity, enabling a bankruptcy court
to disregard separate corporate entities, to pierce their corporate veils in the usual metaphor, in order to
reach assets for the satisfaction of debts of a related corporation." James Talcott, Inc. v. Wharton (In re
Continental Vending Machine Corp.), 517 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1975). "The consolidated assets
create a single fund from which all claims against the consolidated debtors are satisfied; duplicate and
inter-company claims are extinguished, and, the creditors of the consolidated entities are combined for
purposes of voting on reorganization plans." Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 764
(9th Cir. 2000). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuwTcY, supra note 11, 105.09, at 105-84 to
105-104 (discussing substantive consolidation). Thus, there is some risk this structural subordination
would not be respected in a subsequent proceeding.
6 Cf. Stark, II,et al., supranote 64 (discussing spin-offs that expropriate wealth from
bondholders).
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method used depends on the particular language of the covenants to be
evaded. This discussion of secured creditors benefiting from a negative
pledge demonstrates that the presence of a negative pledge does not assure
that the holder of a secured claim, after a reorganization, will have property
with an actual value at least equal to the value of the collateral as of the
time of the reorganization.
One final observation merits mention. The plan of reorganization
depicted in Figures 3 and 4 preserves the pre-reorganization value of the
secured creditor S. The pre-reorganization value of secured creditor S,
however, is not a floor on the value of its position immediately following a
reorganization. An alternative plan of reorganization to that depicted in
Figure 3, assigning creditor U more debt, thereby decreasing the value
received by creditor S, could be implemented. Using the structural
subordination method described above, the entire unsecured portion of S's
claim could be subordinated to U in a reorganization.
E.

CoNcLusIoNs

One can dispute whether, in the context of assessing the allegiance of
Bebchuk and Fried's proposal to the ex ante bargain, a proper conception of
the ex ante bargain of a secured creditor should be viewed as
incorporating-or being implicitly modified by-the terms of bankruptcy
law. Regardless of how one chooses to resolve that question, however, a
secured creditor is not always entitled to receive in a reorganization, with
respect to the secured portion of its claim, property of an actual value equal
to the actual value of the collateral at that time (up to the amount of the
claim).
If bankruptcy law is not considered to be incorporated into the explicit
bargain, the creditor is entitled to receive the value of the collateral (up to
the value of the claim) where the claim is then matured (but for the
bankruptcy). But, where the claim is not matured (but for the bankruptcy)
and the collateral value is stochastic, respecting the ex ante bargain may
require that the creditor receive less than the value of the collateral at that
time.
If, on the other hand, bankruptcy law is considered to be part of the ex
ante bargain, the reinstatement provisions allow for similar outcomes,
albeit with more dispersion. In some cases, depending on the terms of the
explicit contract, reinstatement may yield the creditor property of
diminished value. In other cases, the reinstatement provisions when
coupled with the feasibility requirement may provide for the secured
creditor to come through the reorganization with a claim whose value was
increased by the reorganization.
The reinstatement provisions also allow for reinstatement of claims that
were in default before bankruptcy.67 Thus, considering the ex ante bargain
67See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (2000) (not conditioning reinstatement on the absence of a pre-petition
default).
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as incorporating the reinstatement provisions of bankruptcy law expands
the set of reorganizations as to which the secured creditor, with respect to
the secured portion of its claim, may be entitled to less than the current
value of the collateral.
1H.
A.

BEBCHUK AND FRIED'S PROPOSAL

DETAILS OF THE BEBCHUK AND FRIED PROPOSAL

Bebchuk and Fried propose a multi-stage, market-based method for
addressing secured claims in a reorganization. The method flows from
their reconceptualization of a secured claim as comprising two constituent
elements: (i) a nonrecourse note, secured by the collateral, having a face
amount equal to the amount of the secured claim and (ii) an unsecured

(residual) part.68 To value the original secured claim (i.e., the claim having
these two constituent componentsj,
6 they propose that, in the context of a
sale of the debtor firm as a whole:
first, the secured claim is divided into these two constituent elements;
second, shortly before the end of the bankruptcy proceedings, the
nonrecourse note is sold in an auction;
third, the cash raised from this auction would pay the secured portion
of the original secured claim;
fourth, cash raised from the sale of the debtor is used to pay unsecured
claims, including any unsecured portion of this secured claim (the amount
of which now can be determined by reference to the value attributed to the
nonrecourse note); and
fifth, shortly thereafter, the bidder winning the auction of the
nonrecourse note can auction the collateral and keep the proceeds, up to the
face amount of the note.70
It is possible that a debtor may value collateral more than any other
potential owner. A market-based substitute for Chapter 11 has to address
how such a debtor can retain the collateral. One problem is that, as the

debtor is necessarily in financial distress, liquidity problems may prevent
the debtor from being able to pay for the collateral at that time.
Part of the complexity of Bebchuk and Fried's proposed mechanism is
due to their attempt to address this concern. They separate any foreclosure
sale from the valuation of a secured claim, postponing any foreclosure sale
until after the debtor emerges from bankruptcy. That postponement should,

See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 15, at 2411-12.
& Fried also discuss the application of this method to resolutions other than a sale of
the firm
70 as a whole (bargaining and options). See id. at 2427-29.
See id.at 2412-14.
71See id.at 2392.
63

69 Bebchuk
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in their view, mitigate liquidity problems 72of a debtor that attaches unique
value to the collateral and should retain it.
There are theoretical objections to the proposition that the winning bid
in an auction produces an accurate valuation.73 Of course, the relevant
inquiry is whether an auction provides an accurate price at an appropriate
cost, relative to available alternatives. But, even if the auction mechanism
produces accurate valuations, the auction may result in overpayment to the
secured creditor.
The last step in Bebchuk and Fried's method involves a sale of the
collateral. They contemplate the nonrecourse note sold in the auction will
be due shortly after the debtor's emergence from bankruptcy proceedings,
that is, any foreclosure sale of the collateral would occur shortly after that
emergence.74 A proper pricing in the foreclosure sale would result in the
sale proceeds being equal to the expected value of the collateral. The
nonrecourse note would therefore be valued in the auction referenced after
second, above,75 based on the expected value of the collateral.76

As Bebchuk and Fried envision the scheme, the secured creditor can
"bid in" its claim in an auction of the nonrecourse note. 77 That allows a
creditor to place a bid in the amount of its claim, where payment in the
case of a winning bid, is made in the form of a release of the claim. 78
If the secured creditor understands the property to be worth at least the
value of its claim, Bebchuk and Fried's mechanism allows this creditor to
receive property of a value equal to the amount of the claim. Drawing on
the illustration depicted in Figure 1, consider a nonrecourse claim in the
amount of $20, on property worth $20, consisting of a seventy-five percent
chance of being worth $25 and a twenty-five percent chance of being worth
$5. The creditor is permitted to "bid in" its claim of $20 for the
nonrecourse note. Thus, the auction will produce a winning bid of at least
$20. If the secured creditor prevails in the auction, it can similarly bid $20
in the subsequent foreclosure sale for the note it owns. The creditor will
receive, in the end, either $20 or the collateral (worth at least $20). 79
72See id. at 2425.
73 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597, 625

(1989) ("In an auction of an asset of uncertain value, bidders are vulnerable to the 'winner's curse':
Even if they estimate value accurately on average, they win the bidding primarily when they
overestimate an asset's true value, and thus tend to overpay on average."). The possibility of a winner's
curse may depress bidding, producing an indeterminate effect on price.
74See Bebchuk & Fried, supranote 15, at 2424.
75See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
76 Bebchuk and Fried note the value received in an auction of an undersecured
nonrecourse note
may not precisely match the value of the collateral. See infra note 79.
7 Bebchuk & Fried, supranote 15, at 2421.
78 See generally Andrea Coles-Bjerre, Trusting the Process and Mistrusting the Results: A
StructuralPerspective on Article 9 s Low-Price ForeclosureRule, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 351,
356 n.24 (2001). "When a secured party bids in all or part of its indebtedness, no money changes
hands; rather than paying money to itself, the secured party simply credits the debtor with, or forgives,
the portion of the debt that has been bid in." Id. citing Donald J. Rapson, The Efficient Treatment of
Deficiency Claims: Gilmore Would Have Repented, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 504 (1997).
9 Bebchuk & Fried note the proceeds of the auction of the nonrecourse note may be slightly less
than the value of the collateral, to account for the possibility of depreciation of the collateral between
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Bebchuk and Fried recognize the possibility that the secured creditor's
claim may not be matured. Under their scheme, where a claim is not
matured' ' "its value would be discounted to reflect the time value of
money. b1
Where the due date is a material period of time in the future, the
outcome may be substantially affected by the choice of a discount rate.
Choice of an appropriate discount rate is not trivial. In various contexts,
courts currently are required to select an appropriate discount rate. For
example, payments to be made to a dissenting, impaired creditor under a
plan may be required to be discounted to confirm that the creditor is
receiving property
82 of a value not less than the value that would be received
in liquidation. Inconsistent procedures have 8been
used in this context and
3
other various contexts to select a discount rate.
For the reasons discussed in Parts I and II, even disregarding the
indeterminacy in the choice of an appropriate discount rate, this auction
mechanism may allow the secured creditor to realize more than its ex ante
bargain.
B.

CALL OPTION REFINEMENT

Bebchuk and Fried's proposal can be reformulated to provide an
approximation of the ex ante bargain. This refinement arises from
84
reconceptualizing the collateral as two separate components, a call option
and the collateral subject to that call option, in only one of which (the
that auction and a subsequent disposition of the collateral. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 15, at 2416

n.102.'oThis
minor deviation will be disregarded.
See id.at 2411 n.95.
81Id.More precisely, they assume the loan is "due." Current law provides unmatured claims can
give rise to a claim in bankruptcy. See supranote 38. A claim for unmatured interest, however, will be
disallowed. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2000). Thus, under current law, a creditor owed an unmatured
claim bearing interest at an above-market rate has a claim in bankruptcy less than the actuarial value of
its claim, and a creditor with a claim bearing interest at a below-market rate has a claim in bankruptcy
greater than the actuarial value of its claim. There is, however, an adjustment made for original issue
discount debt. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, 502.03[3][b][i], at 502-28 to 502-29.
The current law reflects an assessment that the cost of attempting to accommodate that level of
precision in claim valuation, adjusting a creditor's claim for differences between the interest rate due on
the claim and the market rate, is not worth the cost. See id.502.03[3][a], at 502-26 (describing a "rule
of convenience"). Bebchuk and Fried do not clarify why, in their view, the approximation provided
under current law is not cost-effective.
82

See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (2000).

83

See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11,

1129.06[l][c], at 1129-147 (noting use of the

creditor's cost of funds, the rate of interest the payments would be required to bear in the market, and a
specially crafted interest rate based on a spread over the risk-free rate). See generally Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. CF&I Fabricators, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.), 150 F.3d 1293, 1296,
1300-01 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming a trial court's use of a discount rate in valuing a claim, reflecting a
'prudent investor' valuation method," producing a value of S124 million, in lieu of a lower rate put
forth by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., which would have valued the claim at S223 million); In re
EBP, Inc., 172 B.R. 241,245-46 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994) (holding it is improper to use the rate on U.S.
Treasury Bills as the discount rate in calculating the present value of payments to be made by a small,
closely-held business under a plan, for purposes of assessing compliance with 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), which calls for receipt, by an impaired class, of property of a value not less than the
amount that would be received in liquidation).
84"A call option gives the owner the right to buy an asset at a fixed price during a particular time
period." STEPHEN A. Ross, JEFFREY JAFFE, & RANDOLPH v. VESTERFELD, CORPORATE FINANCE 547
(5th ed. 1999).
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collateral subject to that call option) does the creditor have a security
interest.
Consider a hypothetical "call option" written on the collateral. The
option has an exercise price of the amount of the debtor's claim and can be
exercised only at the time the creditor's claim comes due and payable.85
The nonrecourse claim can be reconceptualized as having a security
interest in property (the collateral) subject to this call option. That is, the
security interest is junior to this call option. Where feasible, separating the
collateral into these two components allows one to value the nonrecourse
component properly.
Consider what Bebchuk and Fried would classify as the nonrecourse
component of the secured claim depicted in Figure 1. There would be a
nonrecourse claim of $20, due in one year, on collateral worth $20,
consisting of a seventy-five percent chance of being worth $25 and a
twenty-five percent chance of being worth $5. Hypothesize the collateral
as being subject to a call option, exercisable for $20 at the time the original
secured obligation would become due. The call option is considered an
asset owned by the debtor, not subject to this security interest. This
reformulation of Bebchuk and Fried's proposal produces a proper valuation
of the nonrecourse claim. In the first possible outcome (the property is
worth $25), the value of the property securing the claim ($20-the value of
property worth $25 subject to a European call option, exercisable at the due
date of the debt, with an exercise price of $20) equals the value of the
claim. 86 In the second outcome, the value of the property securing the
claim equals the value of the property ($5), as the call option would expire
unexercised.
This formulation is a limited (i.e., property-specific)
application of the familiar view, for valuation purposes, of the equity of a
firm as a call option on the assets of the firm.87
Thus, one can use a market-based mechanism to value the nonrecourse
constituent element of a secured claim. It is problematic, however, to value
the other, unsecured element of the claim through a market-based
mechanism. The problem is illustrated with an example.
Consider again the secured claim owned by S as depicted in Figure 1.
The nonrecourse element of S's claim is worth $16.25. That is computed
as:
.75 x $20.00 + .25 x $5.00 = $16.25
88
That is the value, subject to the small discrepancy discussed above,
that would be realized through the two-step auction mechanism outlined by
u Discussion of the precise time the option would be exercisable is postponed. See infra Part
llI.c.
The option would be a "European" option-exercisable only at its expiration-as distinguished
from an "American" option-an option exercisable at any time up to the expiration date. See Ross Er
AL., supra note 84, at 546.
Again, for ease of illustration, the time value of money is neglected.
87 See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and CorporateLiabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637,649-50 (1973).
88See supra note 79.
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Bebchuk and Fried, if the collateral were subject to a call option at $20.00.
One can compute this value by examining the foreclosure sale first and
working backward to the auction of the nonrecourse note. The collateral,
subject to this call option, is worth $16.25, as computed above. That is less
than the face amount of the nonrecourse note ($20.00). Because the
nonrecourse note would be due and payable immediately and the collateral
value at that time is less than the face amount of the note, the holder of the
nonrecourse note could retain in full the proceeds of the sale of the
collateral ($16.25).
Valuation of the second component, into which Bebchuk and Fried
divide a secured claim-the unsecured portion-through a market-based
mechanism is, however, problematic. One might attempt to compute the
value of the unsecured portion of the claim as follows:

[

$20.00 -$16.25

($20.00- $16.25)+ $80.00

1$60.00-=$2.69

The principle would be that the secured creditor has an unsecured
claim equal to the difference between the face amount of its claim ($20.00)
and the value of the nonrecourse portion ($16.25), representing a
deficiency of $3.75. Of the assets not subject to a security interest
($60.00), one could give S a proportional interest. The amount of the other
unsecured claims is $80.00, and providing S a proportional interest gives S
a value of $2.69 for its unsecured claim. Of the total $80.00 in assets, S
receives $16.25 + $2.69, or $18.94.
That outcome overcompensates S. As described above, 9 S should
receive $18.62. The discrepancy occurs because the aggregate amount of
the unsecured claims varies between possible outcomes, in response to
variation in the value of the nonrecourse (i.e., secured) portion. The
aggregate amount of the unsecured claims is in the denominator of a
fraction used to compute the amount to be paid on each unsecured claim.
When one takes the expected value of a quotient, that is not, in general, the
same as taking the ratio of the expected values of the numerator and the
denominator.9 C.

CALL OPTION EXERCISE DATE(S)

There are other practical problems in implementing this market-based
solution. Most significantly, it may be difficult to select the exercise date
of the call option. Faithfulness to the ex ante bargain requires addressing
89See supra Part I, fig.2 and accompanying text.
90For example, if some event has two equally likely outcomes, 1/2 and 1/4, the expected value is
3/8; it does not equal 1
-(2)
2

1
+-

2

, or 1/3.
(4)
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how this call option should incorporate the possibility that a secured claim
may have been accelerated by its terms.
Consider again the debtor depicted in Figure 1. Secured creditor S's
claim, although not ordinarily due until one year from the date of the
reorganization, may contain financial covenants that allow for the claim to
be accelerated. Under the ex ante bargain, an acceleration would allow the
creditor to foreclose on the collateral, which raises the issue of how the call
option refinement to the Bebchuk and Fried proposal should accommodate
that circumstance.
Initially, one might consider having multiple call options-a call option
on the collateral exercisable at maturity and one or more call options
exercisable upon the occurrence of a default. For reasons detailed below, a
single call option, exercisable on the earliest event in which the secured
creditor S could have demanded payment in full, produces a reasonable
result.
Under the ex ante bargain, the secured creditor S has the right to have
his interest in the collateral valued whenever it has the right to have the
entire claim paid. This would occur at maturity or at an earlier time when a
covenant default was in existence. 91 It is the secured creditor who gets to
select the time by choosing whether to demand payment.
Ordinarily, it will be in the secured creditor's interest to choose the
earliest possible date. If the collateral will decrease in value over time (i.e.,
depreciate), it is in the creditor's interest to determine as early as possible
the value of the secured portion of its claim. The converse circumstance,
collateral whose expected value is anticipated to increase over time, seems
to be rather unusual. Ordinarily, the value property is expected to have in
the future, after accounting for the time value of money, should place a
floor on its current value.92 Where the collateral has a stochastic value, and
some outcomes result in the creditor being oversecured and others result in
the creditor being undersecured, having the collateral valued early (i.e.,
collapsing the probability distribution) is in the creditor's interest.
Therefore, it would seem frequently to be the case that the proper answer
would involve having the call option exercisable at the earliest time when
secured creditor S could demand payment in full. That outcome minimizes
the value of the call option, thereby maximizing the secured creditor S's
interest in the collateral.
In sum, to value the secured portion of a creditor's (S2) claim (Claim2),
having collateral C2, in a debtor being reorganized using the Bebchuk and
Fried procedure, the nonrecourse note they propose to use to value S 2's
claim should be secured by collateral C2, subject to (junior to) a call option
91 Commercial loans frequently include such financial covenants. See, e.g., NORA J. SCHNEIDER
& JONATHAN R. HARRIS, SeniorLoan Agreements, in 1 DRAFTING COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS SERIES,
155, 239-41 (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., Handbook Series No. 96-04.15, 1996) (form loan
agreement containing financial covenants).
92 One would not normally expect the time value of money to be sufficient to cause a creditor to
delay foreclosure. Loans, however, frequently present such a situation. For example, a creditor might
postpone foreclosure where the loan bears interest at an above-market rate.
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having the following terms: the option would be exercisable at only one
time. The first occurrence of an event that would have been a default under
Claim2 will cause the call option to become exercisable. If there is no such
event, the exercise date would be the date Claim2 ordinarily would mature.
The exercise price would be the amount that would have been due on
Claim2 at that time.
In essence, the call option would, in some way, incorporate the defaults
of Claim2. Some defaults, however, could not practicably be incorporated.
For example, a default in payment of interest ordinarily would allow a
creditor to accelerate an obligation. 93 But, it would not seem practicable to
allow the call option to be triggered when the debtor hypothetically would
have defaulted on payment of interest on Claim2.

D.

CONCLUSION

This Article takes no position on whether Bebchuk and Fried's
proposal itself is feasible. If their proposal is, in fact, preferable to the
current law, some refinement of their proposal, implementing in part the
call option features referenced above, could be even more preferable.
Limiting consideration to business reorganizations, there would be
some collateral as to which implementing this refinement would not be
feasible.
For some types of collateral, collapsing the probability
distribution of future states will be unlikely to change the resolution
materially. Often, the additional cost of implementing a sale subject to a
call option would not be cost-beneficial in the context of individual pieces
of collateral having a relatively small dollar value. Transaction costs
associated with a buyer having to deal with the possible call of property it
acquired in a foreclosure sale would be prohibitive as to some types of
assets.
In a reorganization, it would not be unprecedented for bankruptcy law
to treat certain types of collateral separately. For example, bankruptcy law
now does so as to aircraft.94 Any thoughtful consideration of the Bebchuk
and Fried proposal should include an examination of refining that proposal
through a call option, of the type identified in this Article, on selected types
of collateral.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Bebchuk and Fried have proposed a market-based method for valuing
secured claims in bankruptcy. It involves bifurcating a secured claim into
an unsecured portion and a secured, nonrecourse claim on the collateral.
This Article demonstrates that their proposal does not necessarily
preserve the ex ante bargain as to secured claims that would not be due and
payable, but for bankruptcy, where the collateral has a stochastic value.
93See, e.g., SCHNEIDER & HARRIs, supra note 91, at 263,269.
94See 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000).
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The same is also true for claims in default that can be reinstated in a
contemplated reorganization, if one considers bankruptcy an implied part of
the ex ante bargain.
The reason is that their methodology is based on ascertaining the actual
value of collateral. Secured creditors, however, only have truncated claims
on collateral-claims truncated by the amounts of their respective claims
against the debtors. Where the collateral has a present value that, in some
future states, exceeds the amount of a secured creditor's claim, and, in
other states, is below that amount, valuation of a secured claim depends on
the probability distribution-not merely on the expected value-of those
future states.
This Article also examines a refinement to their proposal. Under that
refinement, the nonrecourse portion of a secured claim is modified so that
the collateral is subject to a call option retained by the debtor. Fully
respecting the ex ante bargain cannot be effected through this refinement,
although it does provide an approximate solution.
The ex ante bargain could be considered dependent on the law that is in
effect at the time the bargain is struck. One could argue, for example, that
if Bebchuk and Fried's proposal were adopted and implemented, following
that procedure would necessarily effect the ex ante bargain of contracts
created after the proposal's enactment.
The broader question is whether, despite its faults, a refinement of the
Bebchuk and Fried proposal, with any appropriate transition rule, is
superior to other alternatives. It is not necessarily fatal that their
methodology, in its original form or refined as described in this Article,
only allows for an approximation of complete faithfulness to currently
negotiated secured creditors' rights. The law cannot achieve perfect
results. That is perhaps particularly the case in the context of bankruptcy
law, where market imperfections can be exacerbated.
The process of reorganizing a debtor can be very complex. It is
difficult in advance to specify fully a rigorous algorithm (i.e., one that
specifies the precise steps to be taken, without recourse to the exercise of
judgment of a party imposing the rules) for treating such a complex system.
It is easy, in attempting to create self-executing rules that eliminate
discretion, to overlook an issue or to produce an algorithm that has
unintended consequences.
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